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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Article 2239 of the Civil Code permits forced heirs to intro-
duce parol evidence in an effort to annul as simulated the con-
tracts of those from whom they inherit. In Miller v. Miller19 the
court rejected as inadmissible hearsay an affidavit of the an-
cestor to the effect that a mortgage granted to his second wife's
brother to secure an advance of $5000 was simulated. It pointed
out that article 2239 does not permit the substitution of hearsay
as legal proof.
In Vath v. Gay20 the court applied Civil Code article 2277, re-
quiring proof by at least one credible witness and other cor-
roborating circumstances of a contract for the payment of
money in excess of $500, and affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment rejecting both the principal and reconventional demands
for lack of sufficient evidence.
A problem of contract interpretation was presented to the
court in Pothier v. Barber Laboratories, Inc.21 The opinion was
well and convincingly reasoned and in accordance with article




In the case of Lake v. Lejeune,' the Supreme Court applied
the rule that authority to an agent to sell real estate must be
specific and in writing and concluded that an attorney at law, as
such, has no authority to contract for the sale of his client's real
estate. The case also involved a holding that where the parties
to an agreement for the sale of property stipulate that the Tprice
shall be fixed by experts to be appointed by them, either has it
in his power to prevent the perfection of the sale by refusing to
make the appointment. No mention was made of the possibility
of recovering damages based on the failure to appoint. In an
earlier and factually weaker case, the right of the plaintiff to
sue for damages was reserved.2 The opinion in the instant case
19. 226 La. 273, 76 So.2d 3 (1954).
20. 226 La. 873, 77 So.2d 519 (1955).
21. 227 La. 357, 79 So.2d 481 (1955).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 48, 74 So.2d 899 (1954).
2. Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. O'Shee, 111 La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904).
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did not discuss the point but it has been much discussed in
France. The latest holding of the Cour de Cassation recognizes
the possibility of a recovery of damages.3 The theory is that
under such an agreement each party is contractually bound to
appoint an expert and must respond in damages if he fails to do
so, notwithstanding that enforcement in nature will not be de-
creed nor appointment by the court substituted.
The rule in France is that the sale of standing timber is the
sale of a movable. Prior to 1904 this was the rule in Louisiana.
In that year the Legislature adopted an act providing that stand-
ing timber is an immovable and "subject to all the laws of the
State on the subject of immovables."14 Among the provisions of
the Civil Code relating to immovables are a number of articles
which adjust the rights of the parties where, in the sale of an
immovable, there is a shortage or an overplus in the measure-
ment called for by the act of sale. One of these articles fixes a
prescriptive period of one year on the action for a supplement
or diminution of the price dating from the day of the contract. 5
In Martin Timber Co. v. Jean Lumber Co.," this article was ap-
plied to a sale of 1,470,496 feet of pine timber "marked with blue
paint at the ground level growing and situated upon the follow-
ing described property." The court pointed out that the effect
of the 1904 act is to subject sales of standing timber to the ar-
ticles of the Civil Code dealing with delivery of immovables and
accordingly it found that the action was barred by prescription.
The plaintiff, alleging a deficiency of 103,393 feet, was claiming
the return of a proportionate part of the purchase price. Con-
trary to his insistence that he had purchased simply a specified
number of feet of pine timber, the court's view was that the con-
tract showed that the vendor sold certain standing timber, lo-
cated on certain described land for a lump price. The language
of the contract, however, as reflected in the opinion, seems to
bear out the plaintiff's contention. Here was not a sale of all
merchantable pine timber on the described property but that
particular timber "marked with blue paint." There seems to be
no clear analogy between such a transaction and the sale of a
certain and limited body for a fixed price, or a sale per aver-
3. Chabreiron v. Mouton, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. civ.) April 25,
1952, [1952] Dalloz Jurisprudence 635.
4. La. Acts 1904, No. 188. p. 420; LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2498 (1870).
6. 227 La. 894, 80 So.2d 855 (1955).
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sionem as the court suggested might have been the true nature
of the transaction. In addition, the question before the court was
one of prescription and since there is no way to determine the
exact quantity of timber sold until cut and measured, the pro-
priety of applying a prescriptive period dating from the date of
the sale as in sales of real estate is not manifest. All of which
suggests that it is questionable legislating to enact a statute, of
the kind here involved, as sweeping in its terms.
The cloudy concept of default has again obscured the way of
justice -unnecessarily, the writer continues to believe7 In
Shell Oil Co. v. Hogan,8 a contract to sell certain commercial
property, duly recorded, provided that the act of sale was to be
passed on March 4, 1954, "or on such other date as might be
mutually agreed upon by the parties." The contract to sell also
imposed certain obligations on the seller. These obligations the
seller proceeded to violate immediately. March 4th came and
went without action. Ten days later the seller sold the property
to another. A month later the purchaser, Shell Oil Company,
sued for specific performance. It argued, apparently, that it did
not have to put defendant in default by offering to perform on
March 4th inasmuch as the defendant had actively breached the
contract by violating the obligations imposed upon him. The
court, conceding this to be true, said that plaintiff, by seeking
specific performance and waiving the breaches, had elected to
treat the contract as unbroken, hence its failure to offer to per-
form on March 4th deprived it of the right to specific perform-
ance. According to the Code the remedies for non-performance
are specific enforcement or dissolution with or without damages.9
When a defendant opposes a suit for specific performance, as
here, he is actually claiming dissolution. The Code provides in
article 2047 that when dissolution is demanded the court may
allow "the party in default" further time for performance. Con-
sequently, even assuming that the Shell Company was in default,
the court had the power to allow it further time for performance.
And this is as it should be. A mere failure to perform after de-
mand made should not terminate the other party's duty unless
7. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-
Sale, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 236 (1953) ; The Work of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-Sale, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 166
(19.50); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-
Sale, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 230 (1948).
8. 228 La. 37, 81 So.2d 761 (1955).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2046, 2047 (1870).
[Vol. XVI
1956] CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 245
the default is so material that justice demands such result. Fur-
thermore, a party is supposedly not in default by failing to per-
form on time. After mature deliberation it was so held in Erwin
v. Fenwick.10 Presumably that holding is still the law, at least
if time is not of the essence. In some earlier cases involving sim-
ilar holdings the court seemed to stress this latter qualification
and rely on it." But nothing was said to this effect in the instant
case. It does seem clear that the parties must not have consid-
ered time as being of vital importance inasmuch as the act of
sale was to be passed on "March 4th, 1954, or on such other date
as might be mutually agreed upon by the parties." Indeed, time
is seldom of the essence in contracts for the sale of real estate
and, more particularly, with reference to the obligation of the
buyer. If time is so vital that holding a party to his duty after
the day fixed for performance has passed would impose on him
a hardship that could not be compensated by an award of mora-
tory damages he should be held discharged. But since the Shell
Company's obligation was merely one to pay money, and in view
of the unjustifiable conduct of the defendant, further time might
well have been allowed if the court had felt free to dispose of
the case on such basis. It may be that in view of the decisions
rendered in recent years, which the court followed, these views
should no longer be expressed. But the eyes of hope are restless.
Perhaps someday a putting in default, if required at all, will be
considered necessary only when delay damages are being claimed.
Then we will go back to the function of this requirement as it
was apparently understood by the draftsmen of the French Civil
Code. 12 And then the effect of a breach by one party on the duty
of the other party will be considered, as it should be, on the
merits.
It is an established principle that a person who has contracted
to purchase real property will not be compelled to accept a title
that will expose him to litigation. This principle was applied
and the purchaser was given judgment for a return of the pur-
chase price plus costs, expenses, and attorney's fees, as provided
in the contract to sell, in Oatis v. Delcuze.13 The objections to the
10. 6 Mart.(N.S.) 229 (La. 1827).
11. See Di Cristina v. Weiser. 215 La. 1115, 42 So.2d 868 (1949) ; Lamar v.
Young, 211 La. 837, 30 So.2d 853 (1947).
12. 8 FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES THAVAUX PRItPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL
232 (1836).
13. 226 La. 751, 77 So.2d 28 (1954).
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title emanated from the fact that the property did not conform
with the applicable zoning regulations.
The case of Southwest Steel Corp. v. Jumonville14 involved
merely a question of whether the defendant, sued on certain
promissory notes given for the purchase price of three infantry
landing craft, had received a clear title thereto. The court found
that he had, on ample evidence.
An action in redhibition brought by a dealer against a manu-
facturer with respect to two air conditioning units was before
the court in Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corporation.15 The
dealer was compelled to remove the units after they had been in-
stalled on the premises of a purchaser. The manufacturer of-
fered several defenses, none of which was found valid.'
To succeed in a suit based on lesion beyond moiety the bur-
den is on the party claiming lesion to establish, by strong and
convincing proof, that the price paid was less than one-half of
the value of the property at the time of the sale. The court's
opinion in Foos v. Creaghan1T clearly shows that the plaintiff
failed to shoulder this burden, as the court found.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court refused, in Pierce
v. Roussel,'8 to set aside a sale of land for alleged fraud on the
part of the buyer or lesion beyond moiety. Proof of the fraud
was wholly lacking and the court understandably concluded that
the market value of property cannot be fixed by an estimate con-
cerning the value of recoverable oil lying beneath it. It concluded
that there was no proof that the price was lesionary.
What may be considered an extension of the public records
doctrine is to be found in the case of Smith v. Taylor.9 It was
there held that an abstractor who discovered an error in the sec-
tion number in a sheriff's deed would be protected in his acquisi-
tion of the property from the former owner under a correct de-
scription. In an earlier case ° the court had held that where a
14. 228 La. 240, 81 So.2d 875 (1955).
15. 228 La. 116, 81 So.2d 830 (1955).
16. A note on the Radalee case will appear in a later issue of the Louisiana
Law Review.
17. 226 La. 619, 76 So.2d 907 (1954).
18. 227 La. 438, 79 So.2d 567 (1955).
19. 226 La. 235, 75 So.2d 850 (1954).
20. Quatre Parish Co. v. Beauregard Parish School Board, 220 La. 592, 57
So.2d 197 (1952).
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deed actually describes a tract of land different from that in-
tended to be conveyed, its registry cannot be regarded as furnish-
ing notice to third persons. If it should have been believed that
a third person who had actual knowledge of the error in the de-
scription could not benefit by the rule the court has now given
its answer to the contrary. It is, of course, hornbook law that
such a purchaser can effectively buy despite his knowledge of a
prior unrecorded deed and the situation before the court may be
considered analogous, since in consequence of the error there was
no deed of record transferring the particular property. The case
was also decided, however, on a second ground, viz., that the
judgment under which the seizure and sale occurred was null
and void because the obligation sued on had not matured prior
to the time citation was waived and judgment confessed.
In Stevens v. Stevens21 the court affirmed a district court
judgment annulling, at the suit of the tutrix of certain minor
heirs, a transfer made by their grandmother to her son for a
price less than .one-fourth the value of the property. In its ap-
proval of the district court's finding as to the value of the prop-
erty, the court remarked that the district judge might properly
have taken into consideration the value of the land for mineral
purposes. This observation should not now be open to question.
The court also held that the plaintiffs did not have to deposit in
the registry of the court the price found to have been paid by
the son since they had not received it.
A consolidation of two suits having the same purpose as the
suit in the Stevens case came before the court as Dietz v. Dietz.
22
The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the problem of
proof to support the claim that a purported sale by an ancestor
to his child of immovable property is a pure simulation or a dona-
tion in disguise. After questioning the statement in two earlier
cases that suits of this nature are not favored, 23 a statement with
little to support it, and less to commend it, the court held that the
plaintiffs had the burden of proving by preponderating or con-
vincing evidence that the sales were without consideration. On
the strength of article 2480 of the Civil Code, the court held
squarely that the burden of proving the reality of one of the sales
21. 227 La. 761, 80 So.2d 399 (1955).
22. 227 La. 801, 80 So.2d 414 (1955).
23. Blackman v. Brown, 155 La. 959, 962, 99 So. 711, 713 (1924) ; Moore v.
Wartelle, 39 La. Ann. 1067, 1070, 3 So. 384, 386 (1887).
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had shifted to the transferee. As to the other, although the
court's language is less specific, and although it found the evi-
dence adduced by the plaintiff too scant to shift the burden, the
court, in remanding the case, nevertheless made it clear that un-
less the transferee produced the notary and witnesses to the act
of sale since they were all available, a finding of simulation
should be made. Apparently, therefore, it appears that when, in
a case of this kind, the plaintiff produces evidence that casts
suspicion on the verity of the transaction, the defendant will be
required to produce evidence supporting the transfer that is
readily available to him.
A transfer by parents to a daughter was sustained in Warden
v. Porter24 against the claim of other forced heirs that it was a
simulation or a donation in disguise. The court approved the
use of parol evidence to show that the transfer was actually a
dation en paiement and held that delivery of the property took
place with delivery of the authentic act of transfer. The prior
jurisprudence clearly sustains the view that where an act of sale
is under attack by third parties, as a simulation or disguised
donation, parol evidence is admissible to show the true cause.
The Code is specific that delivery of an immovable accompanies
the public act although there have been some unnecessary ex-
pressions to the contrary.25
In Dare v. Myrick26 a widow and ten children sued to have a
sale by the deceased husband and father to his brother declared
a pure simulation. Although the facts were strongly suggestive
of a fraudulent scheme between the defendant and his deceased
brother to put the property beyond the reach of his divorced wife,
the plaintiffs were unable to overcome the proof of reality evi-
denced by the deed to the defendant and a cancelled check of the
defendant in the amount of the price. The court properly ques-
tioned plaintiffs' reliance on article 2444 of the Civil Code but
found that they had failed to prove that no price had been paid
for the property.
A finding by the trial court that a sale of a house and lot to
the daughter and son-in-law of the vendors was a fraudulent
simulation was affirmed in Harper v. Rosenblath .2  The evi-
24. 228 La. 27, 81 So.2d 707 (1955).
25. See Queyrouze & Bois v. Thibodeaux, 30 La. Ann. 1114 (1878).
26. 226 h a. 732, 77 So.2d 21 (1954).
27. 227 La. 507, 79 So.2d 863 (1955).
[Vol. XVI
1956] CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
dence of a fraudulent attempt to put the property beyond the
reach of the creditors of the transferors was convincing and the
vendee failed to overcome the presumption of fraud resulting
from continued possession in the vendors. 28 Fraud in cases of
this kind is difficult to prove but the case demonstrates that
where the facts are strong enough the court will not hesitate to
find it.
The case of General Finance Co. v. Riverside Warehouse,
Inc.2 9 involved an interpretation of the responsibility of a ware-
houseman under La. R.S. 54:20 where a quantity of cartons for
which receipts were issued contained, instead of shrimp, cans of
water. The receipt was held to comply with the requirements of
the provision with the result that the warehouseman was ab-
solved of responsibility.
The case of New York Fire Insurance Co. v. Kansas Milling
Co. 3 0 involved a gratuitous loan for use. A valuable ox loaned to
the defendant for exhibition purposes died as a result of injuries
received when the trailer in which it was being towed became
unhitched from the towing truck. The court held that the burden
of showing freedom from any fault was on the borrower. It also
found that this burden had not been satisfied. The obligation of
the borrower is to preserve the thing as a bon p re de famille in
the best possible order and to return it as agreed. If he fails to
return it he may be absolved only if he shows that the failure
was through no fault of his. No such showing was made in
the instant case.
LEASE
An interesting problem of first impression was before the
Supreme Court in Bloom v. Southern Amusement Co.31 Plaintiff-
lessor was seeking damages because of defendant's alleged failure
to comply with a provision in the contract of lease requiring the
lessee to "keep the theatre modernized.., and up to date fixtures
therein at all times." At the time suit was filed the lease had
three years yet to run but the plaintiff did not ask for its disso-
lution. After a comprehensive review of conflicting opinions
expressed by French commentators the court concluded that the
action for damages, without a prayer for dissolution, was pre-
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2480 (1870).
29. 227 La. 270, 79 So.2d 305 (1955).
30. 227 La. 976, 81 So.2d 15 (1955).
31. 228 La. 44, 81 So.2d 763 (1955).
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mature. The court seemed to have been guided by practical con-
siderations involving difficulties in adjusting the rights of the
parties without a dissolution of the lease in the event the lessee,
by an award of damages against him, should be compelled to pay
for the repairs he had bound himself to make. The opinion indi-
cated that a suit for dissolution with damages would lie under
such circumstances through a proper application of article 2711.
It is believed that the same conclusion is given direct support by
article 2729 of the Code which renders applicable article 2046.
Ordinarily, a lessor may not obtain a dissolution of the lease and
rent accruing thereafter. But article 2711 specifically obligates
the lessee to pay rent until the thing is again leased when the
dissolution of the lease is obtained on the ground that he has
made another use of the thing leased. Consequently, if article
2711 applies to facts such as those before the court, the lessor
would be entitled to dissolution, damages, and a recovery of rent
until the premises are again leased.
In Wall v. Green32 the plaintiff-lessor, seeking eviction and
judgment for unmatured rent, secured the former, the court hav-
ing found that the lessee had failed to pay his rent when due and
had neglected to keep the premises insured for the benefit of the
lessor. The defendant had excepted on the ground of improper
cumulation. The judgment of the lower court reserved to plain-
tiff the right to sue under a cancellation clause for the unma-
tured rent. In view of the fact that the lessee was evicted and
possession delivered to the plaintiff by the judgment, there is a
serious question as to whether plaintiff should be entitled to re-
cover rent unmatured at the time possession was surrendered. 33
Perhaps the lower court, on the basis of defendant's exceptions,
should simply have compelled the lessor to make election between
recovery of possession or a judgment for rent to the end of the
lease. He should not be entitled to both. The Supreme Court did
not find it necessary to pass on this point.
In Moore v. Lelong34 a lessee of land for the purpose of culti-
vation claimed damages under R.S. 9:3203 for an alleged wrong-
ful dispossession by the landlord. His suit failed for lack of ade-
quate proof except as to the conversion of 305 bales of hay by
the landlord.
32. 228 La. 59, 81 So.2d 769 (1955).
33. Henry Rose Mere. & Mfg. Co. v. Stearns, 154 La. 946, 98 So. 429 (1923);
Sigur v. Lloyd, 1 La. Ann. 421 (1846).
34. 226 La. 962, 77 So.2d 729 (1955).
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